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REACTIONS TO INDEFINITE PREVENTIVE DETENTION:
AN ANALYSIS OF HOW THE SINGAPORE, UNITED
KINGDOM AND AMERICAN JUDICIARY GIVE VOICE TO
THE LAW IN THE FACE OF (COUNTER) TERRORISM
EUNICE CHUA*
"[A] mid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent" - and it is up to judges to give voice
to the law. Acts of terrorism have not ceased since 11 September 2001 and news of
fresh attacks or foiled attempts continues to surface regularly. It is not surprising that
in order to preserve the nation state, governments have used legislative tools to deter
and punish terrorism, including the tool of indefinite preventive detention. In this
article, I analyse the pieces of legislation providing for indefinite preventive detention
in Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the judicial response
to them. Adopting Justice Aharon Barak's approach, I submit that the ideal role for the
judiciary in responding to counter-terrorism is two-fold: (1) to bridge the gap between
law and society and (2) to protect the constitution and democracy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is very much alive today in all corners of the world. The New York
World Trade Centre suffered attacks in 1993 and yet again on 11 September
2001. Britain had to cope with bombings of its London buses and subways on
7 July 2005. However, no less worrisome are the foiled plots-more than 50
Muslim Americans have been arrested for various plots since 11 September and
"close to 30 plots" have been uncovered by Britain's MI-5. 1 More recently, on
30 June 2007 and the days following, Britain had to deal with attempted car
bombings at Glasgow Airport and in central London. Singapore has had its own
near-miss with the discovery of the Jemaah Islamiyah plot targeting Yishun Mass
Rapid Transit Station.
The international response to terrorism has been both quick and robust. This
paper seeks to canvass the different judicial responses to one aspect of counter-
terrorism in the United States of America (the "USA"), the United Kingdom
("UK") and Singapore-indefinite preventive detention. It also attempts to pos-
tulate an ideal role for the judiciary to play in counter-terrorist efforts. Due to
this focus, the most recent development in the USA, namely the enactment of
* LL.B. (National University of Singapore), 2007. The author wrote this essay in her final
year of her LL.B. degree. It won the first prize at the Singapore Law Review Writing
Competition 2007.
1 Chua Lee Hoong, "Long Shadow of Terrorism" The Straits Times (11 December 2006).
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the Military Commissions Act, which has attracted little judicial discussion, will
not be canvassed in detail.
II. THE JUDICIARYAND COUNTER-TERRORISM
Alexander Hamilton described the judiciary as:
[H]a[ving] no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society... It may truly be said
to have neither the Force nor Will, but merely judgement... The judiciary
is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power.
2
Why then do we look to the judiciary to check the executive and the legis-
lature, especially when they wield extraordinary powers of detention that would
seek to circumvent the judicial system? It has been said that the ultimate check
on government is democracy, but consider a country like Singapore where the
People's Action Party ("PAP") has been in power since 1959. Such a check is
illusory. Yet even in multi-party countries, the people may fail to be sufficiently
concerned with the civil liberties of a minority they perceive as threatening. The
protection of human rights is so essential that it has to be insulated from the
majority. 3 In the 2004 presidential elections in the USA, the Republicans were
returned to power despite their severe stance towards suspected terrorists. 4 Thus,
the judiciary may be a weak check on government, but in many situations, it is
the best that we have.
However, all this is based on the assumption that there is a need to check
the Executive and Legislative branches of government. In the context of a war or
national emergency sparked by terrorism, this need seemingly weakens and the
instinctive response has been to empower and strengthen the government, 5 for
one, by granting powers of indefinite detention without trial. There must be a
balance such that the state is not sacrificed on the altar of human rights.
6
2 Quoted in Kevin Tan & Thio Li-Ann, Constitutional Law in Malaysia & Singapore, 2nd
ed. (Asia: Butterworths, 1997) at 300.
3 Aharon Barak, "Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy" 116 Harv. L. Rev. 16 at 39 [Barak].
4 In a survey conducted by the National Public Radio News, Kaiser Family Foundation
and Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, a 48% of the respon-
dents supported giving law enforcement broader authority to detain suspects indefinitely
without charging them. 48% opposed and the remaining 4% did not know. This
is surely a very precarious result. See Poll: Security Trumps Civil Liberties, National
Public Radio News (30 November 2001), online: NPR News Special Report <http://
www.npr.org/programs/specials/poll/civil-liberties/civil-liberties-static-results-4.html>.
5 See Victor V. Ramraj, "Terrorism, Security, and Rights: A New Dialogue" [2002] 1 Sing.
J.L.S. 1.
6 Barak, supra note 3 at 44.
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III. THE LAW ON PREVENTIVE DETENTION
Both the UK and the USA reacted to the September 11 attacks with new pieces of
legislation. The UK speedily enacted the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act
("ATCSA")7 in the last months of 2001, with the bill rushing through Parliament
in barely a month.8 In the USA, Congress passed a joint resolution six days
after the attack, authorising the President to "use all necessary and appropriate
force" against those "he determines" were responsible for the terrorist attacks on
September 11 (the "AUMF").9 A few weeks later, Congress also enacted the USA
PATRIOT Act ("Patriot Act"), 0 "after minimal hearings and scant debate".11
In contrast, this flurry of legislative activity was absent in Singapore, who
"had only to perform a relatively minor tweaking of its laws." 12 The power of
detention without trial for a potentially unlimited amount of time had already
existed in Singapore since 1948, when the Emergency Regulations Ordinance
was enacted to tackle the social and economic chaos brought about by guerrilla
warfare carried out by the Malayan Communist Party.13 This power continued
and takes the present form of the Internal Security Act ("ISA'). 14
A. The Infernal ISA
Section 8 of Singapore's ISA gives the Minister the power to detain a person for any
period not exceeding two years on the precondition that the President is "satisfied"
that "it is necessary to do so" "with a view to preventing that person from acting
in any manner prejudicial to the security of Singapore ... or to the maintenance
of public order or essential services therein". Detention may be renewed by the
President indefinitely as long as the grounds for detention continue to exist. 15 The
7 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (U.K.), 2001, c. 24 [ATCSA].
8 Christopher Harding, "International Terrorism: The British Response" [2002] 1 Sing.
J.L.S. 16 at 16; Adam Tompkins, "Legislating Against Terror" [2002] EL. 205 at 205
[Tompkins].
9 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
[AUMF].
10 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
1 William C. Banks, "United States Responses to September 11" in M. Hor, V. Ramraj and
K. Roach, eds., GlobalAnti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004) at 492 [Banks].
12 Michael Hor, "Terrorism and the Criminal Law: Singapore's Solution" [2002] 1 Sing. J.L.S.
30 at 31.
13 Yee Chee Wai, Monica Ho and Daniel Seng, "Judicial Review of Preventive Detention
under the Internal Security Act- A Summary of Developments" (1989) 5 Sing. L. Rev. 66
at 69.
14 Internal Security Act (Cap. 143, 1985 Rev. Ed. Sing.) [ISA].
15 Ibid., s.8(2).
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power to order detention is supplemented by the power to arrest under section 74.
This provision allows the police to arrest without warrant, and to detain pending
enquiries, any person against whom there is "reason to believe" falls under section
8. This detention upon arrest is limited to a total of 30 days,16 implying that the
Minister must make an order within this time period or the detainee must be
released.
Before Constitutional Amendment 1 of 1989,17 article 149(1) of the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Singapore provided for the validity of the ISA
"notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with Articles 9, 13 or 14". These articles
are part of the "fundamental liberties" section of the Constitution, and provide
protection for the right to liberty, the freedom of movement, as well as the free-
dom of speech, assembly and association. Thus, detention under the ISA cannot
be challenged on the basis of deprivation of these rights.
The executive power of detention under the ISA must be set in the political
context of Singapore, where there is not only essentially one party in power, there
is also a unicameral Parliament, so that all legislative power is concentrated in
one body.18 Moreover, because the Westminster model of government Singa-
pore inherited from the UK,19 this legislative body is practically fused with the
executive via the connecting link of the Cabinet.
20
B. The Anti-ImmigrantATCSA2
1
In the UK, the power of preventive detention was conferred by sections 21 and
23 of the ATCSA. Section 21 gives the Minister the power to preventively detain
non-citizens on the basis of: (1) reasonable belief that that person's presence in the
UK poses a risk to national security; and (2) reasonable suspicion that the person
is a terrorist. This grant of power, like that under the ISA, is broad enough to be
used against persons outside the definition of "terrorist", which in itself is a very
expansive one.22 But unlike the ISA, where the executive has to be satisfied that
the detention is "necessary", the ATCSA has a lower standard of "reasonable".
16 Ibid., s. 74(4).
17 See Part III.A. below, for a detailed discussion of the Constitutional Amendment.
18 An Upper House may provide added scrutiny over proposed legislation and at the very least
would have a delaying, if not a vetoing power. Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional
Engineering, 2d ed. (Hampshire: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997) at 184-185.
19 With one significant difference being that Singapore also has an elected president who
has the ability to oversee detentions under the ISA. But this ability is a limited one-the
President may only go against the advice of Cabinet if an Advisory Board under artide
151(4) concurs with the President.
20 Thio Li-Ann, "The Constitutional Framework of Powers" in Kevin Tan, ed., The Singapore
Legal System, 2d ed. (Singapore: Coronet Books, 1999) at 86.
21 For an overview of responses to terrorism in the UK before the ATCSA see Dana Keith,
"In the Name of National Security or Insecurity?: The Potential Indefinite Detention of
Noncitizen" (2004) 16 Fla. J. Int'l. L. 405 at 425-433 [Keith].
22 ATCSA, supra note 7, s. 21(2); and see Tompkins, supra note 8 at 211.
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Notably, the ATCSA fails to provide for a time limit after the arrest of a
suspect by which proceedings must be commenced against him. As a result,
indefinite detention becomes a possibility even before the Minister makes any
determination. Not surprisingly, indefinite detention is also possible after the
Minister certifies the detainee to be a threat to national security. Section 23
of the ATCSA allows detention to be carried out despite removal from the UK
being prevented because of law relating to international agreements or "a practical
consideration". Thus, the "three-walled prison "23 envisioned by the government
becomes a "four-walled" one, making it necessary for the UK to derogate from
Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"). 24 This
derogation is akin to the erosion of the fundamental liberties in ISA cases.
C. Triple-Barrelled Executive Power
In the USA, the executive has used three principal means25 to carry out preven-
tive detention: (1) the President may designate persons as "enemy combatants"
and detain them either pursuant to a Military Order26 (for non-citizens) or the
AUMF 27 (for citizens); (2) the Attorney General may take into custody any alien
whom he certifies that he has "reasonable grounds to believe" is "engaged in any
other activity that endangers the national security of the USA' under section 412
of the Patriot Act; or (3) the Attorney General may arrest and detain an alien
pending removal proceedings via various provisions of immigration law and other
laws targeting non-citizens. 28 There is no statutory maximum for the length of
detention under the first two of these three means. With regard to immigration
law, indefinite mandatory detention is explicitly permissible for deportable and
criminal non-citizens.
29
The "enemy combatant" designation is especially problematic because of the
nebulous nature of the "war on terror". It is possible to argue that the "war on
terror" is an ongoing effort, given the "polymorph and novel threats posed by
23 See A and ors. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2005] 3 All. E.R 169 (H.L.)
at para. 212 [A and ors.].
24 Keith, supra note 21 at 44 3.
25 Curiously, the US does not have specific anti-terrorist legislation, generally preferring
to incorporate anti-terrorism measures into pre-existing laws. This is perhaps partially
attributable to the US's inimitable system of federal government, but is probably primarily
the consequence of the limited exposure the US has to terrorist attacks on home soil. Keith,
supra note 21 at 4 16.
26 Military Order of November 13 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (2001).
27 AUME, supra note 9.
28 These include the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, the Anti-terrorism and the Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, as well as the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See Keith, supra note 21
at 417-425 for a discussion of these laws.
29 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) (1952) [INA]; ibid. at 424.
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terrorist networks"30 -as long as terrorist cells continue to exist there will always
be a threat of attack. Additionally, unlike the "reasonable grounds to believe" cri-
teria under the Patriot Act, the Military Order only requires "reason to believe".
As for the AUMF, it is not even clear that Congress intended it to be used for
detaining persons. This seems to give the President near-complete freedom to
designate whom he pleases as "enemy combatant". A similarly broad discretion
is also available to the Attorney General under immigration law. Further, since
the regime under the Military Order and the AUMF is outside the traditional
civilian and military justice system, a designated "enemy combatant" may not
have access to counsel or even be informed of the reasons for his designation.
The exclusion of judicial review under immigration law 31 is just as worrying.
This raises the issue of what Constitutional protections the detainees may be
accorded and whether non-citizens and citizens have the same protection. How-
ever, one positive aspect of the law in the USA is that unlike in Singapore or in
the UK, there are no formal limitations placed on fundamental Constitutional
rights.
D. A Comparison of the Laws
A comparison of the detention regimes in all three countries reveals the
ATCSA to be the harshest piece of legislation save for the USA's detention of
"enemy combatants" under a military regime and the detention of aliens under
immigration law.
The ATCSA is harsh because first, it specifically targets non-citizens. Both
Singapore's and the USA's laws, immigration laws excepted, do not discriminate
on the basis of citizenship but on the more rational basis of whoever poses a threat
to security. Second, the complete exclusion of judicial review under sections 21
and 23 of the ATCSA is unparalleled in the USA3 2 and Singapore.33 Third, the
ATCSA fails to specify a time period in which the Minister must commence
proceedings against the detainee. Under the ISA, there is at least a 30 day maxi-
mum for pre-order detention. The Attorney General's power to detain under the
Patriot Act is similarly limited to the length of time that deportation proceedings
are pending.
The detention of "enemy combatants" by the USA probably cannot be chal-
lenged on the basis of discrimination. However, the uncertainty with respect to
30 Vincent Joel-Proux, "If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for your Life:
Reflections on the Indefinite Detention andTargeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists" (2005)
56 Hastings LJ. 801 at 825-826 [Joel-Proulx].
31 INA, supra note 29, §1226(e).
32 Again, immigration law is the exception. See INA, supra note 29, §1226(e). There is no
explicit exclusion of judicial review under the Patriot Act.
33 Before being amended in 1989 the ISA did not have an ouster clause, and even after the
1989 amendment, judicial review still existed albeit limited to procedural matters.
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the length of detention and the lack of procedural safeguards certainly make for
a strong challenge on the basis of deprivation of due process. The same can also
be said of the use of immigration law.
IV. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
With these pieces of arguably draconian legislation in place, it was only a matter
of time before detainees took their grievances before the courts in each country.
In Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs ("Chng"),' 4 the Singapore Court
of Appeal held for the detainees on a technical ground but in obiter advocated
an objective standard of review. In the UK, the House of Lords flexed muscle in
A & ors. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ("A & ors. ")35 and held
the indefinite detention of foreigners inconsistent with the Human Rights Act
1998.36 The Supreme Court of the USA also held in favour of the detainees in
Rasul v. Bush37 and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,38 recognising the detainees' right to due
process. These cases arguably showcased the judiciary at the height of protecting
the individual from the horror of indefinite detention imposed by the executive.
However, a closer analysis reveals that these high points may be in reality more
symbolic than significant.
A. Singapore: Ultimately Passive
It is submitted that Singapore's judiciary is ultimately passive not because of any
weakness in Chng, but because the courts later allowed Chng to be legislatively
overruled without offering any hint of resistance. To my mind, Chng still stands
out as a shining example of sound and careful judicial reasoning as the court
boldly departed from precedent in order to develop the law.
1. From Subjective to Objective
Before Chng, there was the case of Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs
("Lee"), 39 to which the later ISA amendment had pegged the law of judicial
review. In Lee, the court held that the satisfaction of the President, a precondition
for detention, was a "purely subjective condition so as to exclude a judicial enquiry
into the sufficiency of the grounds to justify the detention".4 Thus, the court
14 [1988] 1 Sing. L.R 132 (C.A.) [Chng].
35 A and ors., supra note 23.
36 Human RightsAct 1998 (U.K.), 1998, c. 42.
17 542 U.S. 466 (2004) [Rasul].
38 542 U.S. 507 (2004) [Hamdi].
'9 [1971] 2 Mal. LJ. 137 (Sing. H.C.).
40 Ibid. at 145.
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found that an affidavit by the Minister of Home Affairs was sufficient evidence
of Presidential satisfaction. The court also rejected the argument that it should
be able to inquire into the bona fides of the President.41 In this respect, the Lee
subjective standard is more deferential than that propounded in the landmark
case of Liversidge v. Anderson ("Liversidge").42 There, Lord Macmillan (part of the
majority) stated that the Secretary of State had to consider that sufficient grounds
existed for detention and act in good faith.
43
However, even this standard was too low for the Court of Appeal deciding
Chng, who preferred Lord Atkin's dissenting approach. The court's endorsement
of the objective standard of review meant that judges could examine whether
the executive's decision was in fact based on national security considerations,
as well as whether the executive's considerations in determining the detention
necessary fell within the scope of the purposes specified in section 8(1) of the
ISA. The Chief Justice memorably said, "[a]ll1 power has legal limits and the rule
of law demands that the courts be able to examine the exercise of discretionary
power.44
2. The Legislature Intervenes
Unfortunately, less than two weeks after the decision in Chng, it was announced
that the ISA would be amended to restore the law to its former state.45 Approx-
imately a month later, Parliament passed two bills-the first to amend the
Constitution;46 and the second, to amend the ISA.47 The "main purpose" of
both bills was to restore the law on judicial review of Executive discretion under
the ISA to the "subjective test" applied in Lee.48
In order to achieve this purpose, articles 8A, 8B, 8C and 8D were added
to the ISA to define "judicial review", 49 limit the scope of judicial review to
procedural matters, remove appeals to the Privy Council, and allow the amend-
ments to operate retrospectively. The Constitution also had to be amended to
pre-empt challenges to the ISA amendments. First, appeals to the Privy Council
from Part XII (Special Powers Against Subversion and Emergency Powers) were
removed. Second, the notwithstanding clause in article 14 9(1)(e) was expanded
41 Ibid.
42 [1942] A.C. 206 (H.L.).
43 Ibid. at 248.
44 Chng, supra note 34 at para. 86.
45 Supra note 13 at 98.
46 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Act, No. 1 of 1989.
47 Internal Security (Amendment) Act, No. 2 of 1989.
48 Sing., Parliamentary Debates, vol. 52, col. 463 at 463 (25 January 1989) (Prof S.
Jayakumar).
49 This included proceedings instituted by way of habeas corpus and "any other suit or action
relating to or arising out of any decision made or act done" under powers conferred by the
ISA. ISA, supra note 14, s. 8A(c) and (d).
(2007)
Reactions to Indefinite Preventive Detention
to include references to articles 11 (Protection Against Retrospective Criminal
Laws) and 12 (Equality).5 Finally, it was made clear that the notwithstanding
clause applied to amendments to the laws against subversion, not just to
existing laws.
51
Significantly, when the Bill to amend the Constitution was tabled, there were
81 elected Members of Parliament ("MP")-80 from the PAP. 52 Considering
that a Bill amending the Constitution requires a supporting vote of not less
than two-thirds of the total number of elected MPs to be passed, and that the
Party Whip cannot be lifted for Constitutional bills,53 the success of the Con-
stitutional Amendment was a foregone conclusion. Thus, Chng was easily and
comprehensively overruled in a day.
54
3. Back to the Subjective Standard
Yet the Singapore judiciary was given another chance at reasserting the objec-
tive standard in Teo Soh Lung v. Minister of Home Affairs ("Teo"). 55 There, the
appellant argued that the purported amendments to section 8 of the ISA were
unconstitutional. Admittedly, because of the Legislature's careful efforts to immu-
nise the amendments to the ISA from challenge, the court would have had to
take a far bolder step than it did in Chng. The only way that the appeal could be
allowed was if the court took a "thick" formulation of the Rule of Law as requir-
ing the judiciary to have the ability to substantively review executive decisions.
This argument could be founded on the principle of separation of powers that
50 The Minister for Law explicitly stated that the inclusion of article 11 was necessary to
ensure the retrospective application of the Internal Security (Amendment) Bill was not
challenged, and article 12 was necessary because the Court of Appeal had commented that
a subjective test might be inconsistent with the right to equality. Supra note 48 at 473-473.
51 Article 149(1) as amended now reads:
"If an Act recites that action has been taken or threatened by any substantial body
of persons, whether inside or outside Singapore-
(e) which is prejudicial to the security of Singapore, any provision of that law
designed to stop or prevent that action or any amendment to that law or any
provision in any law enacted under clause (3) is valid notwithstanding that it is
inconsistent with Article 9, 11, 12, 13 or 14, or would, apart from this Article,
be outside the legislative power of Parliament."
52 The only elected opposition MP was Chiam See Tong who voted against the Consti-
tutional Amendment Bill. See supra note 48 at 529; and "Members of Parliament (7th
Parliament)", Parliament of Singapore (last reviewed 22 March 2006), online: <http://
www.parliament.gov.sg/AboutUs/Org-MP-PastMP7.htm>.
53 Li-AnnWee "PAP MPs to vote freely on school reforms" Straits Times (17 November 2002).
54 Like the anti-terrorist legislation in the UK and US, speedy parliamentary action
accompanied curtailment of civil liberties.
55 [1989] 2 Mal. L. J. 449 (Sing. C.A.).
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the Constitution is implicitly premised on 56 as well as fumndamental principles of
natural justice. 57
However, the court took a very "thin" and positivistic approach, holding
that reaffirming the subjective test of judicial review in Lee cannot be said to
be contrary to the Rule of Law or usurping judicial power. This was because
Parliament was doing no more than enacting the Rule of Law relating to the law
applicable to judicial review. This reasoning seems to imply that Singapore courts
will not question any act of the Legislature as long as it is procedurally sound-a
significant regression from Chng. In light of Singapore's political context, this
"thin" formulation of the Rule of Law further weakens the ability of the judiciary
to check possible abuse of detention under the ISA.
B. The United Kingdom: Active (Relatively)
An inherent limitation to the UK court's power of judicial review is that unlike
in Singapore or the USA, the UK does not have a supreme written Constitution.
Thus, the UK courts do not have the power to strike down legislation as invalid. 58
However, under the Human Rights Act, the court may determine if a piece of
primary legislation is compatible with the Act.
59
This was the power that the House of Lords used in A &ors, where it held eight
to one that the UK's derogation was not authorised by article 15 of the ECHR.
Article 15(1) required that measures derogating from ECHR obligations must
be "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". 6 The court
then quashed the derogation order and issued a declaration of incompatibility.
In this discussion, I will focus on the standard of review that the court applied in
coming to this conclusion.
1. Is there ' public emergency threatening the life of the nation'?
In determining whether derogation was justified, the majority showed deference
to the executive. This is seen most clearly in the judges' various interpretations of
Ireland v. UK, where the European Court of Human Rights held that:
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of
the moment, the national authorities are ... in a better position than the
56 ItwasrecognizedinHinds v. The Queen, [1977] A.C. 195 (P.C. on appeal fromJamaica) that
the basic principle of separation of powers were a "necessary implication" in Constitutions
based on the Westminster model, of which Singapore's is an example.
57 In OngAh Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, [1980] A.C. 64 at7l (P.C. on appeal from Singapore),
the Privy Council held that the "law" means a system of law that incorporates fundamental
rules of natural justice.
58 Keith, supra note 21 at 414.
59 Human Rights Act, supra note 36, s. 4.
60 European Convention on Human Rights, 4 November 1950, T.S. 71 (1953) art. 15(1).
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international judge to decide both on the presence of... an emergency
and on the nature and scope of derogations necessary to avert it.61
The majority took this to mean that great weight should be given to the
judgement of the executive because "a pre-eminently political judgement" was
involved. 62 However, Lord Hoffman read Ireland v. UK very differently. He
reasoned that since the Strasbourg court felt unsuited to make the decision, it
was for the UK court to decide the matter for itself63
This divergence of views goes to the issue of justiciability-the majority's
approach is based on the premise that some matters, for example political decisions
and decisions of national security, are outside the function of the judiciary and
solely for the executive and legislature. Lord Bingham's judgement implies that
this reluctance has two sources: a fear of encroaching on the territory of the other
branches of government; and a fear of incompetence. 64 Lord Hoffman apparently
found clear authority in the Human Rights Act to justify review of the existence
of a public emergency and did not address the concerns of his fellow judges.
2. Were the measures taken "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation'?
However, on the issue of proportionality, the majority clearly felt that it was
necessary for them to play a substantial reviewing role. Lord Hope of Craighead
stated:
We are dealing with actions taken on behalf of society as a whole which
affect the rights and freedoms of the individual. This is where the
courts may legitimately intervene, to ensure that the actions taken are
proportionate.
6 5
Thus, any restriction of the right to personal liberty had to be closely scruti-
nised by the national court. The majority then held that section 23 of the ATCSA
did not rationally address the threat that the government sought to address the
threat to security presented by Al Qaeda terrorists and their supporters. This was
because the threat did not derive solely from foreigners but also from UK nation-
als. In fact, a significant number of persons suspected of terrorist involvement
in the UK are British citizens.66 Section 23, being discriminatory, could not be
strictly required within article 15 of the ECHR and so was disproportionate. Lord
Nicholls summed up the position of the majority aptly-"indefinite imprison-
ment without charge or trial is anathema in any country which observes the rule
61 A and ors., supra note 23 at para. 18.
62 Ibid. at para. 29.
63 Ibid. at para. 92.
64 Ibid. at para. 18.
65 Ibid. at para. 108.
66 Ibid. at para. 76.
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of law ... wholly exceptional circumstances must exist before this extreme step
can be justified". 67
Evidently, the courts are active when they are called upon to enforce individual
rights by exercising a power conferred by explicit statutory terms. It is when they
have to define their own judicial role that the English judges tend to be more
cautious and deferential. The judges are also more active when dealing with the
legal concept of "proportionality", unlike the factual enquiry (arguably within
the discretion of the democratic organs of the state) of whether there is a "public
emergency threatening the life of the nation". Perhaps the court also did not want
to do more than it had to in order to achieve the result that the provisions of the
ATCSA relating to indefinite detention of non-citizens were invalid.
C. The United States ofAmerica: Ambivalent
The USA is well-known for its civil libertarian tradition, especially when it
comes to constitutional rights. 68 Since nearly all of these constitutional rights
are expressed as rights of "persons", it follows that aliens in the USA, and not
merely citizens, ought to enjoy substantial constitutional protection. 69 However,
the judiciary has not consistently provided protection for non-citizens and instead
has shown considerable deference to the executive in many cases.
70
1. The Scope of Constitutional Protection for Non-Citizens
Despite the USA having the capability to detain both citizens and non-citizens
under the anti-terrorist rubric, non-citizens have more laws targeted at them than
do citizens. For example, the Patriot Act does not address the preventive detention
of citizens, but only non-citizens. Additionally there is the use of immigration
law. In Demore v. HyungJoon K'm,71 Hyung was a Korean citizen and permanent
resident of the USA who had been convicted of burglary as well as petty theft
and subsequently detained under the Immigration and Nationality Act pending
removal proceedings. In a writ for certiorari, the USA Supreme Court upheld
mandatory preventive detention without any individualized assessment of the
need for detention,72 on the basis that "Congress regularly makes rules that would
be unacceptable if applied to citizens". 73 This was despite the general protection
offered by the Constitution.
67 Ibid. at para. 74.
68 Joel-Proulx, supra note 30 at 836.
69 Karen C. Tumlin, "Comment, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy is Reshaping
Immigration Policy" (2004) 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1173 at 1182.
70 Joel-Proulx, supra note 30 at 838.
71 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
72 David Cole, 'Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens?
(2003) 25 T Jefferson L. Rev. 367 at 368.
73 Ibid. at 521.
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In contrast, the recent case of Rasul v. Bush ("Rasul")74 augurs better for
non-citizens. There, the Supreme Court recognized the right of habeas corpus for
detainees at Guantanamo Bay who were not USA citizens. Because the Solicitor
General had conceded that the court would have habeas jurisdiction over a USA
citizen in Guantanamo, the court held that:
Considering that the statute draws no distinction between Americans and
aliens held in federal custody, there is little reason to think that Congress
intended the geographical coverage of the statute to vary depending on
the detainee's citizenship.
75
This is a clear statement that constitutional protection ought to apply equally
to citizens and non-citizens made in the context of detention of persons captured
in the course of a military campaign. What more someone like Hyung who was
lawfully within the USA and had merely committed burglary and petty theft?
However, although arriving at a fair result, the Rasul decision focused on the
interpretation of a statute rather than with substantive issues. Justice Kennedy,
who concurred in the majority's judgement, wrote separately to express a different
approach. He would have assessed the factual situation and asked if the circum-
stances permitted judicial interference with the executive and Congress.76 This
approach recognises that "there are circumstances in which the courts maintain
the power and the responsibility to protect persons from unlawful detention even
where military affairs are implicated". 77 Further, Rasul was decided solely on the
issue of jurisdiction and it remains to be seen what reasoning the court would
employ in dealing with the due process issues in the case.
2. Indefinite detention without trial of "enemy combatants"
The issue of due process did arise in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld ("Hamdi"). 78 Like Rasul,
Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan in the course of the USA's military campaign
and designated an "enemy combatant". Unlike Rasul, Hamdi was a citizen of
the USA and detained on a naval brig off the coast of the USA rather than at
Guantanamo. In the period of over two years that Hamdi was detained, he was
denied the right to send or receive any communication outside his prison and
denied access to counsel to represent him.
Ultimately, the court held eight to one that Hamdi had not received due
process and ordered that Hamdi was entitled to present his own factual case to
rebut the Government's position. This was surely a fair result, but in arriving at
this conclusion, the plurality showed a large amount of deference to the executive.
74 Rasul, supra note 37.
75 Ibid. at 481.
76 Ibid. at 487.
77 Ibid.
78 Hamdi, supra note 38.
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First, on the issue of authorization, five judges interpreted the AUMF
broadly and held that it authorized the detention of "enemy combatants". The
requirement in section 4 001 (a) of the Non-Detention Act (that a detention be
"pursuant to an Act of Congress") was thus satisfied. Despite the absence of any
reference to detention in the AUMF, the plurality held that since in passing the
AUMF Congress intended to target individuals who fought against the USA in
Afghanistan, this extended to detaining them to prevent them from rejoining the
conflict. Detention was authorized as long as USA troops were involved in active
combat in Afghanistan.
However, this is in reality a very easily satisfied requirement and hardly justi-
fies detention nor limits its length. As pointed out by Justice Souter, in light of
the circumstances of its adoption, surely section 4001 (a) required a clear state-
ment of Congressional intent to detain individuals. 79 Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Stevens went even further to argue that based on historical precedent, the
government could only detain Hamdi: (1) if Congress had suspended the right
to habeas corpus; or (2) after a criminal law trial.80
Second, with respect to the constitutional rights of a citizen who dis-
putes his "enemy combatant" status, the judges also had different views on
the application of the Fifth Amendment.81 The plurality, in a very deferen-
tial tone, held that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as
an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classi-
fication, and a fair opportunity to rebut the government's factual assertions
before a neutral decision maker.82 In Hamdi's case, the core elements of due
process were not met because "interrogation by one's captor, however effec-
tive an intelligence-gathering tool, hardly constitutes a constitutionally adequate
factfinding before a neutral decisionmaker". 83 However, as if worried that its
holding might offend the government, the plurality went on to state that where
the exigencies of the circumstances demanded, aside from the core elements,
enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.
84
For example, hearsay evidence from the government may be accepted and
there could also be a rebuttable presumption favouring the government's evi-
dence. 85 This may be contrasted with the criminal law standard advocated
in Justice Scalias dissent, which would grant maximum protection to the
individual.
79 A stated purpose of the Non-Detention Act was to prevent a repeat of the arbitrary
detentions of loyal Americans of Japanese ancestry during World War II. Ibid at 543-544.
80 Ibid. at 573.
81 That no "life, liberty, or property" could be taken without "due process of law".
82 Ibid. at 533.
83 Ibid at 537.
84 Ibid at 533-534.
85 Ibid.
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However, in its favour, the plurality explicitly stated that:
Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Exec-
utive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organisations in
times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches
when individual liberties are at stake.
86
V. THE IDEAL ROLE FOR THE JUDICIARY
Extreme formulations of the judicial role may be rejected. I do not think anyone
could advocate giving the executive absolute power and doing away with the
Constitution in the event of a terrorist attack. Neither could a reasonable person
argue for absolute adherence to the letter of the Constitution-"a constitution
is not a prescription for national suicide".8 7 Where the controversy arises, is in
striking that elusive balance between security and freedom.
According to Justice Aharon Barak, President of the Israeli Supreme Court,
the judicial role consists of two elements: (1) to bridge the gap between law and
society; meaning that the judge is a partner in creating law and in doing so, must
maintain the coherence of the legal system as a whole; and (2) to protect the
constitution and democracy; this means that judges must use the powers granted
them by the constitution to safeguard both formal democracy (as expressed in
legislative supremacy), and substantive democracy (as expressed in basic values
and human rights). 88 In countering terrorism, this judicial role remains relevant
and important-"amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent" 89 -it is up to
the judge to give voice to the laws. 90
I submit that Justice Barak's formulation of the judicial role is a workable one.
Since law cannot be made in a vacuum, it is important to consider the specific
circumstances of each country in the fulfilment of the judicial role. This concern
is addressed when the judge seeks to bridge the gap between law and society.
However, there are some constant principles that ought not to be contravened
and these are the principles of democracy, separation of powers and individual
liberty that form the basis of the legal systems of Singapore, the UK and the USA.
A. Singapore: Failure to Address Substantive Democratic Concerns
In Singapore, the acceptance of the subjective test and thus deferring to executive
determination is perhaps understandable. In order to bridge the gap between
86 Ibid at 536.
87 Barak, supra note 3 at 153.
88 Barak, supra note 3 at 25-26.
89 Liversidge, supra note 42.
90 After all, what distinguishes counter-terrorism from terrorism, is that terrorism has no
regard for the law whereas counter-terrorism does.
25 Sing.L.Rev.
Singapore Law Review
law and society, the Singaporean judge has to consider the entire legal system
and the principles that are important to it. This was probably what led the
court in Chng to advocate an objective test despite the ratio of the case being
on a technical issue of lack of evidence. It examined the jurisprudence in other
Commonwealth jurisdictions, noticed that the law had developed since Lee, found
this development applicable to Singapore, and set the stage for a coherent creation
of law.
However, the judicial role also consists of upholding the constitution and
democracy. In the face of clear constitutional and legislative language, the Teo
court could only interpret the law to produce one outcome, an outcome that
recognised legislative supremacy. Where the Teo court failed was in giving recog-
nition to substantive democracy. The issue ought not to have been whether in
passing the particular amendment Parliament was complying with previous judi-
cial pronouncement, but whether Parliament had accorded detainees sufficient
protection in light of the amendment. In coming to a decision on this issue, the
court should take into account the sufficiency of the remaining safeguards should
judicial supervision be removed.
This is not to ask for a fail-safe system, but one that accords with the spirit
of article 151 of the Constitution, which provides for restrictions on preventive
detention. Namely that the detainee: (1) be informed of the grounds of his
detention as soon as may be; (2) be informed of the allegations of fact on which the
order is based subject to disclosures that in the authority's opinion would be against
the national interest; and (3) be given the opportunity of making representations
against the order as soon as may be. 91 If this criteria is not met, then limiting
judicial review to procedural grounds ought to be held unconstitutional.
Article 151 should be interpreted liberally in favour of the individual. In Ong
Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, the court held that Chapter IV of the Constitution
should be generously interpreted "to give to individuals the fill measure" of their
constitutional liberties.92 This should all the more be the case for article 151
liberties, which have already been whittled down as a result of the notwithstand-
ing clause in article 149. Thus, having a presumption in favour of government
evidence should be unacceptable, so should accepting hearsay evidence from the
government.
93
B. The United Kingdom: Uncertainty as to justiciability
In dealing with the issue ofproportionality inA &ors., the English House of Lords
fulfilled their judicial role admirably and held the ATCSA inconsistent with the
Human Rights Act because it was discriminatory. The court upheld democracy
and individual liberty while giving due recognition to legislative supremacy. It
91 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev. Ed.), art. 151.
92 OngAh Chuan, supra note 57 at 70.
93 As was the plurality's opinion in Hamdi.
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also bridged the gap not only between law and society, but also between law
and the European community that it was situated in. However, the court's shying
away from questioning the executive determination of whether there was a public
emergency that threatened the life of the nation, presents an unresolved problem.
Admittedly, the interaction between the three branches of power produces a
tricky legal problem. Lord Bingham's concerns of antagonising the executive and
being ill-equipped to tackle "political" issues are well-founded ones. However, the
problem with classifying decisions as "political" or relating to "national security"
is that the judiciary effectively abdicates from examining these issues. Surely a
better balance could be struck. I propose to tackle this issue by asking "does the
judicial role formulated by Justice Barak require judges to adjudicate the existence
of a public emergency?"
First, judges need to create a coherent framework of law in partnership with
the legislature. Judges in the highest court of any country need to bear in mind
that the precedents they lay down have a long-lasting impact. It takes many years
for common law to move beyond an established precedent; take for example the
majority decision in the 1941 case of Liversidge, which established the subjective
test in matters of national security. The first indication that the majority might
be wrong surfaced a decade later in the Privy Council decision of Nakkuda Ali v.
Jayaratne.94 In 1980, the courts were still grappling with Liversidge in Exparte
Rossminster.95 There, Lord Diplock stated, "the time has come to acknowledge
openly that the majority of this House in Liversidge v. Anderson ... were expedi-
ently and, at that time, perhaps, excusably, wrong and the dissenting speech of
Lord Atkin was right."
96
Ironically, the majority opinion in Liversidge still holds sway in Singapore.
Further, a study of cases from the USA Supreme Court shows that justices are
significantly more likely to curtail rights and liberties during times of war and
other international threats; and that cases directly related to war affect cases
unrelated to the war.97 These empirical results are in all likelihood applicable to
the UK. What this means is that the curtailment of civil liberties during times
of crisis will lead to restrictions of fundamental freedoms even in times of peace.
Thus, it follows that judges ought not to let the executive invoke an "emergency"
too easily.
Second, the judges' role is also to uphold democracy and the constitution,
whether written or unwritten. A crucial portion of the constitution is the protec-
tion of civil liberties, thus the same reasoning as above should apply. However,
judges should also recognize legislative supremacy, which too is a constitutional
principle. Therefore, with regards to determining whether a public emergency
94 [19511 A.C. 66.
95 [1980] A.C. 952.
96 Ibid. at 1011.
97 Lee Epstein et al., "The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War
Cases" (2005) 80 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1 at 8-9 [Epstein].
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threatening the life of a nation exists, judges ought to give due weight to a formal
declaration of emergency or legislation that explicitly limits the judicial role.
C. The United States ofAmerica: Lack of Consistency
Unlike the UK judiciary, USA courts have the powerful tool ofstriking down legis-
lation that is inconsistent with the Constitution. And unlike the Singapore courts,
the USA courts are relatively unconstrained by legislation, with the exception of
provisions of immigration law. However, as established in the study described
above, the USA Supreme Court tends to curtail rights and liberties when the
nation's security is under threat and allows these limitations to carry over into
the decision of ordinary cases. This failure to consistently insist on constitutional
protection inhibits the court's ability to fulfil its ideal judicial role.
First, with regard to the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, it is
perhaps true that such a distinction lies at the heart of immigration law. However,
where the Constitution offers general protection to both citizens and non-citizens,
it should surely take precedence over ordinary legislation. Like the Singapore court
in Teo, the USA courts seem to be avoiding the issue- instead of addressing what
constitutional protections a detainee has, the courts have carried out exercises in
statutory interpretation. For example in Rasul, the court justified habeas juris-
diction over Guantanamo detainees based on the interpretation of the federal
habeas statute, rather than choosing to proceed with a factual inquiry and bal-
ance the detainee's constitutional rights against the requirements of security.98 In
the words of Epstein et al., perhaps "in an effort to protect itself, [the Court]
employed process-oriented rationales to the detriment of substantive determina-
tions of first-order constitutional rights." 99 More attention needs to be paid to
substantive democracy.
Second, with regard to the case of Hamdi, the same criticism can be made of
the plurality's approach to the authorisation of detention. The majority took to
interpreting the AUMF where the better approach would have been that ofJustice
Souter, which was to deal with the substantive aspects of allowing detention to
be authorised by an uncertain Congressional resolution. In Hamdi, the court
also failed to bridge the gap between law and society because it created a new
regime for enemy combatants that was inconsistent with the existing legal system.
Although commendably recognising that it should play a role in protecting the
due process rights of American citizens, the court gave itself such a bit part that
it essentially "Ma[d]e Everything Come Out Right" for the executive.100 The
"neutral decisionmaker" suggested by Justice O'Connor could well be a military
commission and not a civilian court.101 The "core elements" of factual notice and
98 This was the framework that Justice Kennedy would have followed.
99 Epstein, supra note 97 at 100.
100 Justice Scalia further criticized the plurality as having a "Mr. Fix-it Mentality". See Hamdi,
supra note 38 at 576.
101 Banks, supra note 11 at 506.
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an opportunity for rebuttal are also probably insufficient to safeguard the right to
due process, especially if hearsay evidence is admitted and a presumption exists in
favour of the government's evidence. Although the detainee may be able to see the
evidence against him, that evidence may consist of a sketchy and uncorroborated
affidavit like the Mobbs affidavit that was filed in Hamdi.112 The detainee would
additionally have the burden of showing that those allegations are false, even
though it might be next to impossible to find witnesses to support his story.
10 3
This manner of law-making surely distorts the civil libertarian tradition of the
USA legal system and fails to meet the ideal judicial role for the American judiciary.
VI. CONCLUSION- THE AFTERMATH
This paper sought to establish that the ideal role for the judiciary in its treatment
of possibly indefinite preventive detention is unique to each country, but ought
to fulfil the tasks of: (1) developing laws coherently in partnership with the
legislature; and (2) upholding democracy and the Constitution. A look at the
aftermath of the judicial responses described above largely supports this view.
A. Singapore: Status Quo?
In Singapore, the ISA has gone unchallenged by detainees who were suspected of
terrorism. This could be a sign that the ISA has thus far been used only against
the guilty, or it could also be due to the perceived futility in bringing such a
challenge. Either way, with a newly installed Chief Justice, 10 4 it is possible that
the Singapore courts may take a different view of their judicial role in the area of
indefinite preventive detention.
B. The United Kingdom: Repeal of Offending Legislation
Change has occurred in the UK after the House of Lords took a relatively firm
stance in A & ors. The UK legislature has repealed the offending provision of
the ATCSA and indefinite preventive detention has been prima facie abolished.
However, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005,105 the executive has
the power to issue control orders against individuals on similar grounds. These
control orders may be derogating (from article 5 of the Human Rights Act) or
non-derogating. All the control orders issued thus far have been non-derogating
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 "Era ends as CJ steps down" TODAY (Singapore) (1 April 2006). Chan Sek Keong is the
current ChiefJustice of Singapore. According to the article, no "sweeping changes" to the
administration of the Judiciary are expected but there might be other "small changes". Mr.
Chan is described by an unnamed lawyer as "'a very sharp person' who loves the law: 'He
knows how to temper his judgements with mercy".
105 Prevention ofTerrorism Act 2005 (U.K.) 2005, c. 2.
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ones. However, according to Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer, most of the
obligations imposed on the controllees "fall not very far short of house arrest and
certainly inhibit normal life considerably". 1 6 This may raise issues of deprivation
of liberty for the UK courts to address.
C. The United States ofAmerica: New Executive and Legislative Action
As for the USA, the ambivalent judicial response has led to more executive
and legislative activity to the detriment of detainees. In response to Hamdi,
the Department of Defence has convened Combatant Status Review Tribunals
("CSRT") to provide detainees at Guantanamo the chance to challenge their
designation as "enemy combatants". 1 7 The CSRT arguably satisfies the "core
elements" identified by the plurality in Hamdi as necessary for due process.
108
The courts have recently been called upon to examine the CSRT in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld.10 9
Hamdan, allegedly the driver and bodyguard of Osama bin Laden, filed a
habeas petition with the D.C. District Court after being certified an "enemy
combatant" by the CSRT. 110 The District Court held that Hamdan could not be
tried by a military commission unless a competent tribunal determined that
he was not a Prisoner of War as defined under the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tion governing the treatment of prisoners. The Court of Appeal reversed and,
in doing so, rejected Hamdan's argument that the President violated the sep-
aration of powers inherent in the Constitution when he established military
commissions. The court took the same deferential approach of the plurality
in Hamdi-that Congress had authorised military commissions through the
AUMF. 111
Although the Supreme Court recently reversed the Court of Appeal deci-
sion,"' it did so on a narrower basis than did the District Court-that
Congress, via the AUMF, did not expressly authorise military commissions
106 U.K., Lord Carlile, First Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of
the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (2 February 2006), online: Home Office <http://
security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-and-publications 1/publication-search/independent-
reviews/laws-against-terror.pdf>.
107 Kathleen T. Rhem, "Reporters Offered Look Inside Combatant Status Review Tri-
bunals" DefenseLINK News (29 August 2004), online: US Department of Defence
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/n08292004-2004082902.html>.
108 In these proceedings, detainees are allowed a personal representative, who is an assigned
military officer. The personal representatives are obligated to present any unclassified evi-
dence to the detainee and explain there is no expectation of confidentiality in the process.
Ibid.
109 415 E3d 33 (2005).
110 Ibid at 35-36.
... Ibid. at 37-38.
112 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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and that the CSRT structure did not meet the procedural elements that
Congress, through the Uniform Code of Military Justice, required. The lim-
itations of Hamdan are especially obvious in light of the fact that soon after
the Supreme Court decision was released, President Bush sought Congressional
authorization of the military commissions as constituted under the executive
order. 113
True enough, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act ("MCA") in late
September.114 The MCA poses a great threat to non-US citizen detainees deemed
"unlawful enemy combatants" by the CSRT because it removes the jurisdiction
of USA Courts to consider habeas corpus appeals challenging the lawfulness or
conditions of detention from these individuals. 115 In a later part of the Hamdan
saga, after the enactment of the MCA, habeas corpus was denied Hamdan based
on the MCA.1 16 This series of events aptly illustrates how powerfil the Executive
and Legislature can be, especially if the pronouncements by the Judiciary are
deferential.
However, to end the story of Hamdan, on 5 June 2007, the Military Commis-
sion dismissed all charges against him on the ground that the administration had
failed to establish that he was an "unlawful enemy combatant" and thus subject
to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission. 117 Nevertheless, it is hoped that
when the currently pending cases of other detainees arise for decision, the USA
Courts will give more weight to the substantive Constitutional protection due
them.1
1 8
113 Tung Yin, "Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military Detention"
[2006] B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1255 at note 188.
114 This article will only deal briefly with the Military Commissions Act, it being a relatively
recent piece of legislation, which the courts have had little opportunity to comment on. For
a general discussion of the Military Commissions Act see Jennifer Trahan, "Military Com-
mission Trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Do they Satisfy International and Constitutional
Law?" (2007) 30 EI.L.J. 280.
115 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006),
s. 7(a):
(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained
by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.
116 In reHamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749; "Judge Rejects Detention Challenge of Bin Laden's Driver"
Washington Post (14 December 2006).
117 "Stuck in Guantanamo" Washington Post (7 June 2007).
118 The US Supreme Court will have a chance to review the MCAwhen the cases of Boumediene
v. Bush, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8757 and Al Odah v. U.S, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8810 arise to be
heard later in 2007. Also see "Justices to Weigh Detainee Rights" Washington Post (30 June
2007).
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